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Party Professionals, Programmatic Technocrats, Apparatchiks and 
Agents: 




This article contributes to the study of the politics of patronage appointments by creating a 
typology of patronage roles based on the nature of trust between patrons and appointees and 
on the skills patrons seek in appointees.  Our classification brings together the dispersed 
literature on patronage roles and can be applied to the study of modalities of patronage across 
and within countries. We offer preliminary evidence from our study of the politics of 
patronage appointments in Latin America suggesting that variations in patronage roles can be 
related to variations in party systems institutionalisation and to the nature of the links 
between political actors and voters. Finally, we explore whether the categories identified in 
our empirical study can be found in other settings. We conclude that our typology can 
contribute to the study of the impact of modalities of patronage on the quality of the public 
administration and on political governability.   
Keywords: patronage appointments, modalities, roles, trust, skills.  
 
I. Introduction. 
In virtually every country, office holders use their power of patronage to make 
political appointments to public administration. There are  of course, significant variation in 
the number of people appointed through patronage -ranging from a few hundred to 
thousands- and in whether these appointments are made legally or by ignoring or bending 
civil service rules (Piattoni, 2001).  Moreover, variation in patronage are not just a matter of 
numbers or about how far down in the administrative structure patronage extends. Key to the 
comparative study of the politics of patronage appointments is understanding the motivations 
of patrons  when they make appointments, the roles appointees play, the skills required to 
play these roles and what accounts for different modalities of patronage. 
In addressing these issues, the literature on patronage uses a mélange of different 
categories and schemes (or none  at all, as patronage is often treated as synonymous with 
clientelism). This article contributes to the study of the politics of patronage appointments by 
presenting a new typology of patronage roles.   We argue that by creating a typology of  roles 
based on the nature of trust between patrons and appointees and on the skills patrons seek in 
appointees, our classification: i)   brings together the dispersed literature on patronage 
appointments in developed and developing countries; ii) presents a coherent classification of 
the roles played by appointees, which can be applied to the systematic study of patronage 
appointments across and within countries and regions; iii) facilitates better understanding of 
the relations between appointees, political office-holders and political parties; and iv) 
constitutes the building block for understanding differences in patronage roles that define 
modalities of patronage. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to advance a general theory of modalities of 
patronage. Differences in patronage roles can be attributed to diverse factors  reflecting, inter 
alia, priorities of elected office holders, the nature of public administration and characteristics 
of party systems. To facilitate understanding  differences in modalities of patronage, we offer 
preliminary evidence from our study of the politics of patronage appointments in Latin 
America.  This research supports the argument that among the drivers of the variation of 
patronage roles variations party systems institutionalisation as well as the  nature of the links 
between parties and voters can be related to variations in patronage roles 
The reminder of this article is structured as follows. First, we define patronage 
appointments and review how the comparative literature has approached the study of patrons’ 
motivations and the classification of patronage roles. Second, we present, define and justify 
our typology. Third, we apply our typology to the empirical study of patronage roles in a 
number of Latin American countries, and explore the variation through our hypothesized 
drivers. Finally, we explore whether the categories identified in our empirical study can be 
found in other settings, and whether our typology can facilitate comparisons of patronage 
roles across world regions for which somewhat different conceptions have been used. 
II. Unpacking patronage appointments. 
 
We define patronage appointments as the power of political actors to appoint 
individuals by discretion to non-elective positions in the public sector, irrespectively of the 
legality of the decision (Kopecký, Mair and Spirova, 2012).  The definition does not make 
assumptions about the motivations for the appointments, the roles played by appointees, their 
professional capabilities and the impact of patronage appointments on the quality of public 
administration.    
Our definition covers different modalities of patronage, usually described as 
clientelism in less-developed and transitional political systems and discussed as the 
politicization of the public administration in Western European and North American systems 
(Peters, 2013). While there is a tendency in the literature to use interchangeably the terms 
politicization, patronage and clientelism, the three concepts are analytically different. 
Politicization is a rather broad concept, and includes a range of mechanisms through which 
political actors attempt to influence public administration (Peters, 2013). It can refer to the 
selection of appointees for positions in government on political grounds–patronage per se--, 
but also to other, subtler, ways in which political actors attempt to shape the behaviour of 
public servants (Bach, Hammerschmid, and Löffler, 2018).  Clientelism has been defined as 
“the direct exchange of a citizen’s vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to 
employment, goods and services” (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, 2).  Given that our focus is 
on the public sector employment dimension of clientelistic exchanges, we define clientelistic 
appointments as the exchange of public sector jobs for electoral support (Roniger, 1994). 
Given that according to our concept of patronage appointments, patrons make appointments 
for a range of motives and appointees perform a variety of roles, clientelism is taken here as 
just one among a number of different modalities of patronage and brokerage as one among 
the many roles performed by appointees. 
Scholars have identified a broad set of motivations other than clientelism for making political 
appointments. Kopecký, Mair  and Spirova (2012) produced an important study of party 
patronage and party government in European democracies that was subsequently expanded to 
cover 22 countries from five regions (Kopecký, et al., 2016). These studies consider two 
motivations of patrons :  Control over the formulation and implementation of public policies, 
and reward of supporters for political services. They also classify the criteria for selecting 
personnel on professional, political and personal grounds (Kopecký et al 2016, 417). They 
found that the control of policy making and implementation is the most common motivation 
for making political appointments, particularly in the low patronage scope cases of Western 
Europe. By contrast, in countries with a large scope of patronage, appointments serve both as 
a control and reward function. 
However, these studies fall short of providing a comprehensive analytical tool for 
comparative studies of patronage appointments. Arguably, their classification of modalities of 
patronage is too narrow to provide enough information about what the appointees actually do 
when given a position in the public sector.  For instance, when appointments are made in 
order to control the policymaking process, how do appointees perform the task:  by giving 
technical advice to their patrons in the executive, by controlling the public sector bureaucracy 
or by using their political knowhow   to negotiate policy initiatives through the labyrinth of 
power (Campbell and Peters 1988, 84)? The three roles are significantly different and require 
different skills. When appointments are made to reward militants, what role are these 
militants expected to perform: to engage in political activism on behalf of their patrons, to 
mediate between the ruling party and Congress, or to oversee a bureaucracy often regarded as 
hostile to the ruling party?  Again, different roles require different skills. 
The classification of selection criteria in terms of professional, political and personal grounds 
is also problematic. Professional criteria refer to the skills required from appointees to 
perform their roles, whereas political and personal criteria describe the relation of trust 
between appointer and appointee that is of the essence of patronage relations. Thus, an 
appointee can be selected on technical or political grounds, combined with either political or 
personal trust.  
These lacunae take us back to the importance of unpacking patronage roles by considering 
the roles played by appointees and the skills required to perform them. Studies of the 
politicization of public administrations in developed democracies have identified a wide 
variety of roles played by political appointees and the skills required to perform them. For 
instance, Connaugthton (2015) distinguishes four roles played by ministerial advisers in the 
policy making process in Ireland, according to their influence and impact in the policymaking 
process: expert, partisan, coordinator and minder. Ed Page and his collaborators (LSE GV314 
Group and Page 2012) classify the roles of special advisers in the UK’s public administration 
as “commissars” and “fixers”. And in a large N study of the Norwegian government, Askim, 
Karlsen and Kollvieit (2016) found three distinct roles among political appointees: “‘stand 
in”, “media adviser” and “political coordinator”. Meanwhile, the US literature on public 
administration tends to focus of the competences sought in the appointees and on the overlap 
between political and administrative skills at the top of the public administration hierarchy. 
For instance, Lewis (2011) mentions among the competences loyalty, technical knowledge 
and campaign support. Campbell and Peters (1988) show that even political systems that 
emphasise the separation between politics and administration, governments are populated by 
amphibious functionaries playing multiple roles, requiring different combinations of political 
and technical skills. 
 Variations in the number of political appointees notwithstanding, studies of patronage 
appointments in mature Western democracies tend to concentrate on the roles played by a 
narrow category of political advisers at the top of public  administration.   In contrast, in the 
more politicised public administrations of developing nations, clientelism has been 
traditionally regarded as the main modality of patronage, and in many countries remains an 
important mechanism for gathering electoral support. However, scholars have been 
examining motivations beyond electoral gains and at roles other than political brokerage in 
the study of public administrations in emerging democracies. For example, studies have 
focused on political office-holders’ need for technical advice as the motivation for the 
appointments of trusted technocrats in administrations with low technical capacity or highly 
politicised civil services (Teodoro and Pitcher, 2017), particularly in processes of radical 
policy reform (Dominguez, 2010; Silva, 2009). Others studies have looked at political 
appointments at the upper levels of the public administration as instruments for coalition 
management (Bersch, Praça, & Taylor 2017; Garcia Lopez, 2015). Still others have looked at 
appointees’ roles as political operators responsible for securing political support for policy 
initiatives, or as agents of their principals for controlling the public bureaucracy and state 
resources in patterns not entirely dissimilar to those of Western democracies (Scherlis, 2012). 
In short, patronage appointments are a common feature of the public administrations 
of developing and developed democracies alike. Comparisons between countries and regions 
have centered on differences in scope, often under the assumption of the prevalence of 
clientelism in developing countries compared to developed nations, where patrons’ 
motivations and the roles of appointees exhibit more nuanced characteristics. In light of the 
evidence, this assumption is difficult to sustain. By examining the nature of trust between 
patrons and appointees and the skills required to perform different roles, it becomes possible 
to elaborate assumptions and test hypothesis about the relation between patronage roles, 
political office-holders and political parties, and about the impact of different patronage roles 
on the workings of government, the political system and public administration. 
III. A typology of patronage roles 
1. Trust and skills. 
 
Our typology captures a variety of roles that cuts across modalities of patronage both 
in high and low patronage administrations. We utilize two organising dimensions: the nature 
of trust (partisan or non-partisan), and the type of skills (professional or political) required 
from the appointees. When combined, the two dimensions permit classifying patronage roles 
across different modalities of patronage.  
 
Trust is the essence of patronage. It cuts across other selection criteria and combines 
with them in different measures.  Politicians will normally and naturally tend to appoint 
trustworthy persons and given the asymmetrical power relation between patron and 
appointee, appointments usually terminate when there is a breakdown of trust. The 
significance of trust in patronage appointments is highlighted in a study of special advisers in 
the British government that states that as political commissars “advisers serve as the eyes, 
ears and mouth of the politicians who appoints them”  (LSE GV314 Group and Page, 2012, 
5). And, in some Latin American countries, political appointments are officially denominated 
“positions of special trust”.1 
 
Relations of trust can be based on partisan or on other forms of trust outside 
partisanship, which are here labelled “non-partisan”. In the latter we include personal trust 
between patrons and appointees, appointments made in order to co-opt potential enemies 
(oppositions parties, bureaucrats, etc.), or because the appointee represents some powerful 
corporate interests that the patron seeks to bring on board.    
                                                          
1 “Cargos de particular confianza”. 
The predominance of one type of trust over the other gives information about who has 
appointment power and, indirectly, about the nature of the political system. While legal 
power of appointment almost always resides in an executive office-holder, in practice the 
appointer may just be rubberstamping the appointment of a person trusted by the ruling party 
or by some other significant stakeholder, such as a business association or a trade union that 
have the real power of appointment. The predominance of partisan trust can be taken as an 
indicator of a strong party government or governmental coalition. Conversely, the 
predominance of personal trust may indicate a more personalistic political system, in which 
executive office holders enjoy significant autonomous power relative to parties. 
   
While different types of trust give indications about the nature of the political system, 
different skill sets indicate the different roles appointees perform within the administrative 
machinery and the political system. Some appointees are chosen for their professional 
expertise within a policy field. While a neutral, professionally qualified civil service is 
considered important for good governance, democratically elected politicians have a 
legitimate right to seek advice from politically sympathetic experts. They also can demand 
that public administration implement government policies in an efficient and timely way.  
  
In other cases, appointees are chosen for their capacity to operate politically, which 
does not mean that they lack technical expertise but that the skills sought by the patron are 
predominantly political. Political skills are typically required for brokerage between 
politicians and voters in clientelistic patronage arrangements, but they are also required for 
other roles, even in low patronage political systems.  For instance, political skills are essential 
for media advisers, or to monitor the tenured bureaucracy, or to liaise between executive 
officeholders and the legislature.       
 
We thus produce a typology of modalities of patronage practices combining the two 
dimensions (nature of trust and skillset), defining  four main categories of patronage roles: 
party professionals, programmatic technocrats, political appartchiks and agents, plus a 
number of sub-categories. 






2. Describing patronage roles 
 
Upper Left Quadrant: Party Professionals 
 
Party professionals are appointees combining partisan trust and techno-professional 
competences. These appointees tend to be found in the upper and medium levels of the public 
administration. Their main role is policy design and implementation. Campbell and Peters 
(1988, p. 24) describe party professionals as proactive participants in the policy process that 
combine a technical grasp of at least one policy sector with a consciously held partisan trust. 





Lower Left Quadrant: Programmatic Technocrats 
 
Programmatic technocrats combine technical competence with non-partisan trust. We 
borrow the term from Silva (2009) to describe independent experts who influence their 
political bosses through personal trust and specialized knowledge of a policy field.  These 
appointees can, and in many cases do, sympathize with their patrons’ political ideas, but their 
allegiance is to the office holder and not the ruling party. In some cases, they follow their 
patrons throughout their political careers in different positions in public administration. In 
others, despite being appointed by discretion, they become quasi-permanent members of the 
high public administration, rotating among different positions of responsibility. In this 
capacity, they work for governments of different political affiliations, especially in more 
technocratic types of governments or when the career civil service lacks professional 
expertise.  
 
Upper Right Quadrant: Apparatchiks 
Moving now to the dimension of political skills, in the quadrant that combines it with 
partisan trust we find the category of apparatchiks. With variations, this category appears in 
both emerging and consolidated democracies. The appointment of party loyalists to public 
sector jobs is  a long-standing feature of Latin America’s politicized public administrations 
(Philip, 2003), in which it is often difficult to separate the ruling party, the government and 
the public administration. In European party systems, parties have come to compensate for 
loss of mass membership by becoming increasingly embedded in the state apparatus, drawing 
on state resources to maintain and reward their political cadres (Katz and Mair, 2009).   
Apparatchiks’ roles in public administration derive from their political capital as 
trusted by the party. Within this category there are several subtypes. In their study of 
European patronage, Kopecký et al. (2012) found that the main role of political appointees 
was to control the public administration on behalf of the government. We call this 
subcategory “commissars”.  
We call party operators apparatchiks that use their political skills to articulate support 
for government policy within the party system, particularly within the ruling party or 
government coalition. They are mainly found at the upper and medium levels of public 
administration. They understand the politics of the day, acting as intermediaries within the 
policymaking process by liaising with members of parliament, interest groups and other 
stakeholders. Party operators are particularly relevant when the government lacks a 
parliamentary majority, and in presidential systems in which the president has low or 
moderate powers and is forced to negotiate with Congress, as happens in the US system 
(Halligan, 2003). 
Also within the category of apparatchiks, but at lower levels of the bureaucracy, we 
find electoral brokers whose role is to mediate the particularistic provision of public goods 
between governments and voters, typical of clientelism (Stokes et al., 2013). It is likely that 
this patronage role is more common in service delivery areas and at provincial and municipal 
levels. Finally, political activists at the lower levels of public administration perform no 
distinct role in public administration; their main role is to campaign for the ruling party or to 
act as claques for the party in political rallies. This subcategory has been identified in 
Paraguay by Schuster (2015) and in Argentina by Oliveros (2016). 
 
Lower Right Quadrant: Political Agents 
 
In our fourth quadrant, combining non-partisan trust and political skills we identify 
political agents.  The personal nature of trust gives agents little autonomy from their bosses, 
as they are not protected by party membership. At the higher levels of public administration, 
the typical sub-role is the so-called “minders”. The category fits the profile of a coterie of 
assistants that act as gatekeepers to their political bosses and become their “eyes, ears and 
mouth” (LSE GV314 Group and Page 2012, 5). In Mexico, this category of appointees has 
been traditionally called “cliques” (camarillas) (Langston, 1997), a term that gives a good 
idea of the nature of the relationship with their patrons. At the intermediate level we identify 
the category fixers. Similar to party operators, fixers liaise their patrons with the political 
system to mobilize support for his/her policy initiatives but, again, their loyalty is to their 
patron (normally executive office-holders) rather than to the ruling party.  Finally, at the 
lowest levels of public administration we identify the subcategory of electoral agents. They 
perform the same role as brokers but serve individual politicians as mobilisers and activists in 
electoral campaigns (Mares & Young 2016). 
 
In summary, the roles described above are not mutually exclusive. But despite the 
subtle differences among them, they are also real and have implications for both the 
comparative study of public administration and the study of the relations of patronage 
appointments and political systems. For each category of patronage roles the question of the 
scope of appointments and variations within different areas of the public administration 
remain beyond the scope of this paper.  In the following section we apply our typology to 
varieties of patronage appointments in Latin America. 
IV Varieties of patronage appointments in Latin America. 
 
IV.1 Theoretical assumptions      
The various structural and agency factors influencing patronage appointments make it 
difficult to advance a general theory of modalities of patronage without further extensive 
empirical  research. A parsimonious way of understanding these modalities is to relate our 
typology to some key variables that have the potential to account for significant variation in 
patronage roles.  We assume that parties are key actors in the politics of patronage 
appointments and, hence, that the characteristics of parties and party systems (especially 
party system institutionalisation and the nature of their relations with voters) are important 
explanatory variables in accounting for differences in patronage roles.  
Institutionalization is the process by which organisations and procedures acquire value and 
stability (Huntington, 1968, 12); it is not a dichotomous but a continuous variable. Party 
system institutionalization has been defined as a system in which a set of parties interact 
regularly in stable ways (Mainwaring, 2018, 19). In an institutionalized party system there is 
considerable stability in who the main parties are and in how they behave (Mainwaring, 1998,  
68), even if some parties rise and others decline and the system adapts to new entrants 
(Mainwaring and Torcal 2006, 205). Processes of institutionalization are neither teleological 
nor linear:  parties and party systems institutionalize, de-institutionalize and re-
institutionalize in no pre-determined sequence (Carreras, 2012).  
Two characteristics of institutionalized party system are important for shaping patronage 
roles. The first is the relations between parties and executive office-holders. In countries with 
strongly institutionalized party systems, executive office holders act mainly as agents for 
their parties (Elgie, 2005, 117). Acting as principals, parties and party factions influence 
strongly the politics of patronage by privileging partisan over personal trust. This locates 
patronage appointments in institutionalized party systems predominantly in the upper 
quadrants of our typology and those in less institutionalized systems in the lower ones.  
The second characteristic is party organization. In more institutionalized party systems, party 
organizations are not subordinated to the political career of a leader; they have their own 
independent status and continuity (Huntington, 1968, 12-24). While institutionalized parties 
can, and often do, colonize the state, party organization exists autonomously from the state 
apparatus, precedes the party’s access to government, and survives its demise. However, 
parties with a strong organizational base may use patronage appointments to reward their 
cadres and control the public bureaucracy (Kopecký et al., 2012). This typically requires the 
appointment of a significant number of cadres performing roles located in the top right 
quadrant of our typology.  
Party system institutionalization has also been associated with high levels of programmatic 
commitments. Programmatic or ideological linkages are important means by which voters 
become attached to parties and, hence, by which parties build a stable electoral base that 
promotes party continuity. However, non-programmatic attachments, such as clientelism, can 
produce the same institutional stability, as exemplified by several traditional parties in Latin 
America, such as the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico and the Partido 
Colorado in Paraguay. Conversely, when party systems collapse policy can change abruptly. 
Challenger parties and populist political outsiders can have strong ideological beliefs and 
programmatic preferences, as exemplified by some of the left-wing populist parties in Latin 
America that disrupted party systems in the first decade of this century (Phillip and Panizza 
2011). Hence, whether links with the electorate are programmatic or of a different nature 
depends on the nature of the political actors (both parties and political leaders) rather than on 
the party system as a whole.  
It is conceivable than in a given political system some parties’ link with voters are 
predominantly programmatic while other prioritize non-programmatic, office- seeking 
mechanisms (Strøm and Müller1999). What characterizes  the latter is the goal of maximizing 
their control over political office benefits, that is, private goods bestowed on recipients of 
politically discretionally governmental appointments (1999, 5). Following from this 
classification, when parties are predominantly programmatic, we expect patronage roles to 
concentrate mostly on the left quadrants of our typology and, when they are mainly office-
seeking, on the right- side ones.  However, programmatic –oriented actors may also need 
operators and fixers to articulate support for government policies. Whether these roles will be 
located predominantly in the upper or lower quadrants will, in turn, depend on the 
institutionalization of the relevant actors. In the case of institutionalized parties with 
programmatic links with the electorate, we expect to find more party professionals and 
political operators and more programmatic technocrats and fixers for non-institutionalized 
programmatic actors . When links are of a non-programmatic nature, we expect to find 
brokers and activists in institutionalized party systems and electoral agents in weakly 
institutionalized ones.    
Table 2 below summaries how our theoretical assumptions relate to patronage roles. Our 
classification aims to identify the more frequent patronage roles that could be expected to be 
found in each cell, and not to account for all possible patronage roles and every possible 
explanatory variable. 




IV Varieties of patronage appointments in Latin America. 
 
The stylised presentation of findings in this section draws on our current research on 
modalities of patronage in the central public administrations of seven Latin American 
countries. We focus on ministries because patronage in the core of government has not 
received much attention, insofar as most research has been done at the subnational level, with 
special interest in brokerage and clientelistic practices.  
The project aims at establishing  who has the real power of appointment, the 
motivations for the appointment and the skills patrons seek from appointees. In terms of 
methodology, it adopted the expert survey originally employed by Meyer-Sahling and Venn 
(2012) and Kopecký et al. (2016) for the comparative study of patronage in 22 countries from 
five world regions. Experts were chosen for their direct knowledge of specific areas of the 
central public administration. They answered a semi-structured questionnaire in which they 
were asked to provide quantitative estimates and qualitative accounts of patronage for the 
countries of their expertise.  A copy of the questionnaire is attached as an annex to this paper. 
Information from the experts was checked against official documents and other primary and 
secondary sources. In determining levels of party system institutionalization (PSI), we used 
Mainwaring (2018) PSI score. For establishing the programmatic or otherwise nature of 
political parties, we followed Kitschelt et al. (2010). 
In this article we use preliminary results for Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and 





IV.2. Country findings 
 
Chile, Uruguay and Brazil have the highest PSI scores and Peru the lowest one, with 
Ecuador and Argentina in intermediate positions (Mainwaring, 2018). In the three countries 
with higher PSI scores, the ruling parties’ structure and organization preceded their access to 
office and was autonomous from the state. In Uruguay, the Frente Amplio (FA) was 
established in 1972; in Brazil, the Workers Party was created in 1980; and, in Chile, the 
Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia  (Concertación), an alliance of long-established 
left and left-center parties, was formed in 1988. Our findings on Chile cover the presidencies 
of the center-left administrations of Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010 and 2014-18) and the 
center-right government of Sebastián Piñera (2010-14). Findings on Uruguay correspond to 
the center-left administrations of Tabaré Vázquez (2005-2010) and José Mujica (2010-2015).  
Results from the survey show a predominance of party professionals in both countries 
(Moya Díaz and Garrido Estrada, 2018; and Authors 1 and 3, 2018). The survey also found 
that the governments appointed numerous party operatives and, to a lesser extent,  
commissars. There were, however, some differences between the two countries. Parties in 
Chile have shallower social roots (Luna and Altman, 2011) than in Uruguay, and the party 
system as whole has become less institutionalized over the past decade or so (Corporación 
Latinobarómetro, 2017). In Chile, presidents also have stronger institutional powers than in 
Uruguay. The combination of factors resulted in  a relatively larger number of political 
appointments that   combined technical skills with personal trust (policy professionals), 
particularly at upper levels of public administration (Moya Díaz  and Garrido Estrada, 2018). 
While we still lack full survey results from Brazil, a similar pattern was detected by 
Lopez and Praça (2015) for Brazil’s Federal Public Administration under the Workers’ Party 
governments (2003-2015). The authors found that while patrons required various skills from 
their appointees, the standard requirement was a combination of political and technical skills 
with priority assigned to technical skills (Lopez and Praça, 2015, 112)). Appointees were 
normally connected to the ruling party or coalition parties (party professionals and 
commissars), although not necessarily to the party of the minister in charge. Suggestions of 
names for appointments were often made by members of parliament from the governmental 
coalition (ibid.).  
 On the opposite side of the PSI continuum, we have weakly institutionalized, 
personalistic parties. These parties are often established prior to the elections and do not 
survive after their leaders’ leaving office. Further, there is a strong relation between 
personalistic and weakly institutionalised parties. Peru is the least institutionalized party 
system of our group of countries (Mainwaring, 2018). According to the experts surveyed in 
our project, patronage appointments are common in Peru’s central public administration. But 
in contrast to the appointment of party professionals in the more institutionalized party 
systems of Chile and Uruguay and the administrations of the Workers’ party in Brazil, 
appointments were mainly aimed at recruiting programmatic technocrats(Muñoz and Baraybar, 
2018).    Appointees shared a commitment to the neoliberal economic model in force since the 
1990s, of which they regarded themselves guardians, above the politicians that appointed 
them. During the 2000s, technocrats and high-level bureaucrats managed to consolidate their 
power  vis-à-vis politicians and their almost inexistent political parties (Dargent, 2014). 
Moreover, they displaced more and more professional politicians from power at the 
ministerial level, resembling what Grindle (2012) describes but could not fully find in her 
work: a politicized, weakly institutionalized , programmatic patronage system. 
As noted above, party and party system institutionalization is a continuum. Ecuador 
and Argentina were intermediate cases on this continuum (Mainwaring, 2018). The study of 
Ecuador covers the three presidencies of Rafael Correa (2007-17). The case of Argentina 
covers the presidencies of Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2003-2015). 
In both countries, a period of high political instability and crisis of the party system was 
followed by the emergence of new political forces (Alianza Pais in Ecuador and The Frente  
Por la Victoria (FPV) in Argentina)  that dominated the periods under consideration.    
In Ecuador, the decade between 1996 and 2007 was characterized by a highly 
unstable political system, with three democratically elected presidents unable to finish their 
constitutional mandates.  Since the first electoral victory of Rafael Correa in 2006, the 
country entered a period of political stability: Correa won two successive re-elections and his 
chosen presidential candidate, Lenin Moreno, won a fourth in 2017.  During this time  the 
ruling party, Alianza Pais, evolved from an ad-hoc personal vessel of Correa’s presidential 
ambitions into the dominant political force in the country. Correa’s administrations were 
characterized as techno-populist (De la Torre, 2013). The term describes the government of a 
strong populist leader who was himself a European and American trained economist.  His 
governments appointed a large number of mostly young professionals at high and 
intermediate levels of public administration for the design and implementation of an 
ambitious project of post-neoliberal modernization of the country’s state and society. 
Initially, while appointees shared the president’s vision for the country, most were not 
organically linked to the ruling party, fitting the profile of programmatic technocrats and 
political agents. However, as Correa won successive elections and Alianza País consolidated 
its power, the profile of the appointees shifted accordingly, with more partisan rather than 
personal trust, characteristic of party professionals and commissars (Sandoval, 2018).  
The case of Argentina deserves special consideration. The ruling FPV, formally a branch 
of the Peronist party Partido Justicialista but in practice largely autonomous from it, was 
established in 2003 during a deep political crisis following the collapse of the Argentinean 
economy. While in office, Kirchner stabilised the economy through a post-neoliberal 
development model that significantly departed from the neoliberal orthodoxy of the 1990s 
(Wylde, 2018). The FPV’s candidate, Kirchner’s wife, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, won 
the next two presidential contests in 2007 and 2011 (Nestor Kirchner died in 2010).  
Together, Nestor and Cristina Kirchner, ruled Argentina for 12 years, a record of continuity 
for the country under democracy.  
During their rule, the FPV remained a highly personalistic political machine at the 
political service of the presidents. Patronage mainly took the form of a network of 
appointments directly controlled by the president and his/her closest allies in key agencies, 
and by ministers in their own domains. Technical skills were  valued to implement the 
government heterodox economic program but it was combined with personal rather than 
partisan trust, fitting the characterization of programmatic technocrats. The distinction 
between the personal, the political and the partisan was, however, not always clear. 
Particularly during the administration of  Fernández de Kirchner, appointments shifted from 
being based on loose networks of personal trust and politico-ideological sympathies to more 
strictly partisan criteria. The shift was driven by the president’s attempt to consolidate her 
own political grouping (La Cámpora) from within the state.   In terms of our classification, 
changes in appointment pattern were similar to that of Ecuador, in which technically skilled 
appointees  migrated from the lower left quadrant (programmatic technocrats) to the upper 
left one (party professionals) without perhaps fully fitting either category (Authors 1 and 3, 
forthcoming).   
  The presence of commissars and political agents at middle levels in public 
administration aimed to control and command a bureaucracy that was not trusted by 
government.  In the lower tier of the public administration, the experts surveyed noted that 
the appointment of brokers to mediate between the government and recipients of public 
goods and services was the principal motivation for appointments (Authors 1 and 3, 
forthcoming). Other studies showed that the wider category of political activists was also 
relevant at this level (Zarazaga, 2014). 
Finally, a significant finding, common to all countries covered by our research, is that the 
experts did not identify in any central public administration a significant number of 
appointees that performed electoral-related roles (activists , brokers and electoral agents) , in 
any central public administration in question. Partial exceptions to this finding were 
Argentina and Ecuador (Authors 1 and 3 2018, Sandoval 2018). The lack of mass clientelism 
in the central public administrations contrasts sharply with the strongly clientelistic 
administrations of Paraguay and the Dominican Republic, in which activists and brokers 
make part of a significant proportion of all public sector workers (Kopecký et al 2016; 
Schuster 2015). 
 
In Table 3 we show a  stylized presentation of the dominant patronage roles for each 
country.  










Patronage in other political systems 
A fundamental question for any conceptual scheme is whether it can travel. The greater the 
level of intension of a concept, and the greater the extent to which it is based on the 
experiences of one country or one region, the less likely it is to useful in understanding 
similar phenomena in other settings (Sartori, 1970). Given that the conception of patronage 
and the categories defined through our typology are based heavily on Latin American 
experiences, can these same categories be identified in other settings, and are they useful for 
understanding public administration in those settings?  Further, can these concepts facilitate 
comparison of patronage across regions of the world?   
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, we do believe that these categories do “work” in other settings, 
albeit with some caveats. Indeed, other scholars working in Asia, Africa Europe, and North 
America have identified patronage styles that are not dissimilar to those identified in Latin 
America.  And, like patronage in Latin America, the motivations for using political 
appointments include the need to recruit skilled advisers and managers for government, as 
well as the desire to build political party and personal political followings. There is far from 
sufficient space to provide a complete description of all the other patterns of patronage, but 
we can provide some examples of each of the four major types identified in our typology.   
 
1)  Party Professionals can be found in most countries, including those with generally low 
levels of patronage. They have been the majority of presidential appointments in the United 
States (Lewis, 2008), as well as the “SPADs” in the United Kingdom and their equivalents in 
Commonwealth countries (Eichbaum and Shaw, 2011 ).   This list could be extended to 
include almost all countries, as most ministers want and demand committed policy advisors, 
and may not want to depend on the permanent bureaucracy (Eymeri-Douzans, et al., 2014). 
 
2) Programmatic Technocrats.   These appointments occur less frequently in the advanced 
economies with professional and competent civil services, but certainly do occur outside 
Latin America.  For example, many African countries utilize technocrats because of the 
relatively low levels of talent within their own civil services (Teodoro and Pitcher, 2016). 
And the more advanced countries recruit experts into government during times of crisis, or 
for major policy changes. 
 
3) Apparatchiks. Political leaders in many settings want to control the actions of their 
governments, and often believe that the permanent bureaucracy will not serve them well. This 
pattern of behavior has been found to be especially strong in the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe (Kopecký et al., 2012).  In Central Asian republics, these appointments may 
be made more on the basis of clan ties rather than political party ties, but they still involve 
attempts of political groupings to control the rest of government (Murtazashvili, 2016). 
 
4) Political Agents. Finally, political agents are loyal to an individual politician rather than a 
political party and attempt to exert some control over the remainder of government on behalf 
of that politician. Again, many governments in both more advanced and less advanced 
systems will have these “courtiers” (Savoie, 2008) for the leaders. They perform a variety of 
tasks ranging from the mundane to the extremely important for ministers (see Connaughton, 
2010), but the primary task is advancing the career of the political leader being served.   
 
We could offer more extensive examples for each of the above categories. The fundamental 
point, however, is that these concepts and this typology do have empirical referents outside 
Latin America. Thus, this typology does have the capacity to travel and to be useful for 
comparing patterns of patronage in many political systems, unlike most that have been 
developed to match particular circumstances. Further, the categories developed here help to 
classify and clarify the broad category of patronage in government and demonstrate the 
various ways in which political appointments can be used by parties and individual leaders.   
Analysis, conclusions and further research. 
 
By focussing on the nature of trust between patrons and political appointees and on the skills 
patrons seek in appointees, our typology bridges the gap between politics and public 
administration in the study of patronage appointments. The nature of trust (partisan or not 
partisan)- is aimed at understanding the type of political patrons that have the real power of 
appointment (parties, individual politicians and other actors) and the political systems (more 
or less institutionalised) in which they interact. The nature of skills (technical or political) 
that patrons privilege in appointees, completes the picture by focussing on the other 
dimension of the relation; on what appointees actually do when appointed: advice, control, 
operate politically, campaign, etc. It also helps to perceive the different ways in which 
appointees are active in different arenas: public administration, the political system and the 
wider social environment. The combination of the two allows for an elegant description of 
different modalities of patronage. 
By looking at party system institutionalisation as a dynamic variable and  at the 
programmatic or clientelistic links between parties and citizens, we were able to account for 
why certain political roles were more prevalent in certain Latin American political systems 
than in others, as well as how patronage roles can change through time with changes in 
institutionalisation and programmatic commitment. Results from our survey and secondary 
sources support the assumption that, in highly institutionalized party systems, patrons tend to 
appoint in the upper quadrants of our typology; and, in less institutionalized ones, in the 
lower ones. But these are relative rather than absolute variations and an important caveat is 
necessary. Our findings highlight the importance of considering the dynamic, non-
teleological and uneven nature of the institutionalization and de-institutionalization 
continuum in the changing nature of patronage roles. Our survey shows that changes in PSI 
were reflected in changes in patronage roles in Argentina, Chile and Ecuador. In the case of 
Brazil, PSI scores are likely to be lower after the impeachment of president Rousseff in 2015 
but we lack information about the scope of change and its impact on patronage roles. 
 Our findings also support the importance of differentiating party system 
institutionalization from the programmatic nature of political parties. In Chile and Uruguay, 
party system institutionalization went hand in hand with the programmatic parties. But in 
Ecuador under Correa, and in Argentina under the Kirchners, radical left populist parties in 
weakly institutionalized party systems had strong programmatic commitments combined with 
clientelism. Conversely, Paraguay has a higher PSI score than both Ecuador and Argentina 
(Mainwaring, 2018) but a more clientelistic patronage system (Schuster, 2015).  Meanwhile, 
Peru is an interesting case combining very low PSI scores with considerable programmatic 
continuity, enforced by programmatic technocrats that seem to have more policy making 
authority than their patrons.   
As any model, typologies are a simplification of reality. There are many other variables 
that contribute to explaining variations in patronage roles. Among these are agency factors, 
such as whether governments aspire to a radical political break with the politics and policies 
of previous administrations or, alternatively, if they seek to implement a more gradualist, 
consensus-seeking, process of change. Results from the survey showed that the hyper-
politicized, rupturist Kirchners administrations in Argentina (Panizza, 2016) made political 
control of the bureaucracy a government priority, hence the appointment of a large number of 
commissars (Authors 1 and 3, 2018). In contrast, in Uruguay, the Frente Amplio  largely 
maintained the traditional patterns of bargaining and negotiations which characterize the 
policy making process in the country (Lanzaro, 2014), thus the relatively larger number of 
political operators (Authors 1 and 3, 2018). 
We conclude by returning to the relation between patronage and the politicization of public 
administrations. The study of patronage is often permeated by normative assumptions about 
how the colonization of the state by political appointees undermines both the capacity of the 
public administration and the quality of democracy. The problem with these assumptions is 
that there is surprisingly little comparative empirical research about modalities of patronage, 
and about the impact of different modalities  on the quality of the public administration and 
on political governability.   
Good governance has been associated with a professional and autonomous bureaucracy; but 
despite variations in the utilization of political appointments, there is some sense in using 
more committed political appointees to control the administrative system and public policies. 
These goals require both political and technical skills. Commissars can facilitate policy 
changes by controlling and commanding unresponsive or incompetent public bureaucracies. 
Political operators can contribute to drive policies through by negotiating political support. 
Even brokers find justification in recent literature, as substitutes for deficiencies in 
representative government. Seemingly, despite marked differences in levels of expertise 
available through the permanent bureaucracy, there is a generalised need for policy advice 
and direction of the ministries, coming from individuals committed to the party program or 
the political office holder. Arguably, the predominance of party professionals favours 
responsiveness but raises questions about their relations with the permanent civil service in 
terms of building state capacity and ensuring neutral service delivery, while the abundance of 
programmatic technocrats raises questions about whether they are truly accountable to their 
principals and ultimately to the voters. A more systematic exploration of these issues, and its 
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Table 3. Typological classification of  empirical findings 
 
 
